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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent successes with in vitro or extracorporeal fertilization
* Contributors to this note are Margaret I. Lane, Assistant Dean, T. C. Williams School
of Law, The University of Richmond; B.A., Mary Baldwin College, 1973; J.D., T. C.
Williams School of Law, The University of Richmond, 1979; and students Susan Cross
Bolton and Rose M. Alexander.
This article originated as a result of the authors' work with a subcommittee of the
Virginia Bar Association's Special Issues Committee of State and National Importance
which is examining the topic of in vitro fertilization. Dean Lane serves as a regular member
of the Special Issues Committee and Ms: Bolton and Ms. Alexander were appointed as John
Marshall Fellows to the Committee.
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("IVF") in both England" and the United States2 have led to increased
interest in this new medical technique. For a large number of women, IVF
represents the most promising opportunity for reproduction.3 This break-
through makes it possible for infertile couples to experience for the first
time the joys of natural parenthood that fertile or "normal" couples take
for granted. Pioneers in the field are therefore to be commended for their
work. Unfortunately, like other innovative medical services, the IVF pro-
cedures also breed legal concerns which will demand resolution in the
not-so-distant future. This note will explore these legal concerns and vari-
ous ethical concerns, set forth the history of the IVF technique, and de-
scribe the medical procedure in use today.
II. THE ARRIVAL OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AS A TREATMENT METHOD
A. Why IVF?
After the discovery of the mammalian egg in 1827," great progress was
made in dealing with couples' infertility problems.5 It was not until the
last decade, however, when IVF was developed as a treatment modality,
that the health sciences were able to overcome the obstacle of infertility
where the Fallopian tubes had been surgically removed or were irrepara-
bly damaged or diseased.' The importance of this development is better
understood when it is realized that as many as 560,000 women in the
United States alone suffer from pathology of the oviducts (Fallopian
tubes) which has led them to be infertile. 7
1. See, e.g., Steptoe & Edwards, Birth After the Reimplantation of a Human Embryo, 2
LANCET 366 (1978); All About That Baby, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66; The First Test-
Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 58; N.Y. Times, July 26, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
2. See Richmond News Leader, Aug. 31, 1982, at 7, col. 2 (reporting the births of the
sixth and seventh babies conceived in vitro in the United States).
3. Evans & Dixler, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 245 J.A.M.A. 2324, 2324 (1981).
4. In 1672, DeGraaf found a follicle (which later became known as the Graafian follicle)
on a human ovary and mistook it for an ovum. In 1827, Karl Ernst VonBaer was able to
identify an actual human ovum microscopically. Sperm, however, which are much more eas-
ily obtained, were identified microscopically as early as 1677. It was twenty years, however,
before VonKolliken would correctly describe the development of spermatazoa. Sweeney &
Goldsmith, Test Tube Babies: Medical and Legal Considerations, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 2
(April, 1980) (citing C.E. VONBAER, DE Ovi MAMALIUM ET HOMINI GENESI (1827); A.
VONKOLLIKEN, NEVE DENKSCHR D. ALLQ. SCHWEIZ (1847)).
5. Sweeney & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1. For instance, when a male is infertile the
process of artificial insemination can be utilized, using that male's sperm or, if necessary,
sperm from a donor. Id.
6. Trounson & Wood, Extracorporeal Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 8 CLINICS OB.
& GYN. 681, 682 (1981).
7. There are 60 million women reproductively active in the USA; 7 percent of married
couples are infertile, and a third of these are infertile because of sterility of the wife.
Thus, there are 1,400,000 sterile women in the population. Pathology of the oviducts
(Fallopian tubes) accounts for 40 percent of these cases so that there are 560,000
women with diseased oviducts.
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While there is more than one kind of tubal pathology which can cause
infertility, the major cause is adhesions (inflammatory bands connecting
opposite surfaces). Currently, the most common cause of tubal adhesions
is inflammation of the lining of the uterus to which the tubes connect
directly on either side, by way of two structures known as the horns of
the uterus. Such inflammation can be caused by intra-uterine devices
(IUD's), pelvic inflammatory disease, or gonorrhea. Once the tubes be-
come blocked, it becomes very difficult to restore tubal function.'
Unsuccessful tubal surgery is the most common reason for turning to in
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer. Often from one to three previous
operations have been performed without success.9 Failure to conceive
within two years after surgery, or laparoscopic 0 evidence that both tubes
remain blocked, can provide adequate indication that the surgery was not
successful. For some patients, any attempts at reparative surgery may be
impossible because of the severity and type of the disease.""
B. History of the Development of the Technique
To understand in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer and its signifi-
ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS:
HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANS-
mR, printed in 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,042 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EAB REPORT] (quot-
ing Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Embryo Transfer in the Human 35
(1978) (paper prepared for the Ethics Advisory Board)). See also Hubbard, Test-Tube Ba-
bies: Solution or Problem?, 82 TECH. REV., Mar./Apr. 1980, at 10, 10 (citing figures from
B.E. MENNING, INFERTILITY: A GUIDE FOR THE CHILDLESS COUPLE (1977)). Hubbard defines
infertility as failure to conceive or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after having tried for
at least a year. Id. Precise data on the extent of this particular type of fertility problem are
unavailable. One.reason for this is that many infertile couples never undergo medical diag-
nostic treatment to learn the reason for their infertility.
8. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 10.
9. These operations may have been performed by macrosurgery (viewed by the naked
eye) or the technologically newer microsurgery (viewed through a microscope). Increasing
numbers of microsurgical operations are being performed in efforts to obtain normal tubal
function. Trounson & Wood, supra note 6, at 681.
10. A laparoscopy is a procedure performed under anesthesia in which two small tubes
are inserted into the abdomen through a small incision near the navel. Attached to one tube
is a scope. The public frequently refers to laparoscopy as band-aid surgery because the inci-
sions are so small that a band-aid is the only dressing that is required post-operatively.
Laparoscopy is also the technique used to obtain the ovum for in vitro fertilization.
Through the scope, the physician can see the egg in its follicle attached to the ovary. A
hollow needle is passed through one tube to aspirate the egg which has been detached from
the follicle by forceps which have been passed through the second tube. The procedure is
monitored by TV camera. Moore, Human In Vitro Fertilization: Can We Support It?, 1981
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 442, 443 (Apr. 22).
11. Reparative surgery may be impossible in some cases of severe tubal disease. Thicken-
ing and fibrosis of the tubes or thinning due to tissue breakdown can make passage of ova
through the tube extremely unlikely even if the passageway of the tube is open. Trounson &
Wood, supra note 6, at 682.
1983] 313
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
cance, one needs to first understand the process of ovulation and fertiliza-
tion as it occurs naturally. A human female is born with about one million
oocytes (immature ova) in each of her ovaries. She never produces any
more. Less than 450 of these oocytes are ovulated. Those that are ovu-
lated develop within small ovarian sacs called Graafian follicles in which
they are hormonally stimulated to grow each month. Usually, only one of
these follicles develops in each menstrual cycle. Under natural hormonal
stimulation, the ovum matures, and the Graaian follicle ruptures. The
ovum has then been ovulated, and it enters the upper end of the
oviduct. 2
Fertilization normally takes place in the upper third of the oviduct,
called the ampulla.13 After a sperm has penetrated the ovum, the embryo
begins mitosis, or cell reproduction. During this time period, the embryo,
suspended in the fluids of the Fallopian tube or oviduct, travels toward
and finally enters the uterus. This period is called the pre-implantation
period of pregnancy. Research has indicated that it takes the embryo
three days to get from the ampulla to the uterus. For the next three days,
the embryo floats in uterine secretions while it progresses to the blasto-
cyst14 stage. Six days after conception the blastocyst has adhered to the
inner lining of the uterus, the endometrium, and become implanted.",
This is known as the implantation phase.
In vitro fertilization in humans, using sperm and ova from the infertile
couple and followed by replacement of the embryo in the uterus of the
donor of the ova, was suggested anonymously in 1937 in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine.'8 The first well-documented achievement of in
vitro fertilization of a human ovum, however, was reported in 1970 by the
English Doctors Edwards, Steptoe, and Purdy. Transfer of the embryo
to a uterus apparently was not attempted in this research experiment.
Doctors Edwards and Steptoe subsequently treated Mrs. Lesley Brown -
leading to the well-publicized birth of Louise Brown in 1978.11
In vitro fertilization of human reproductive cells (gametes) is a rela-
12. Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304 Nzw
ENG. J. MED. 336, 337 (1981).
13. Id. at 336.
14. A blastocyst is
a stage in the development of a mammalian embryo which follows the morula which
is the stage immediately following the early cleavage of the zygote. It consists of an
outer layer or trophoblast to which is attached an inner cell mass. The enclosed cav-
ity is the blastocele. The whole is called ... [a] blastocyst.
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY B-33 (2d ed. 1973).
15. Biggers, supra note 12, at 336-37.
16. Anonymous, Conception in a Watchglass, 217 NEw ENG. J. MED. 678 (1937).
17. Edwards, Steptoe, & Purdy, Fertilization and Cleavage In Vitro of Preovular Human
Oocytes, 227 NATUiiE 1307-09 (1970).
18. See sources cited supra note 1.
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tively recent achievement. Successful laboratory experiments with em-
bryo transfer following in vivo (in the womb) fertilization and subsequent
flushing of the embryo were reported almost a hundred years ago,1" but it
was not until 1959 that a successful mammalian in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer using genetically tagged rabbits was reported. 0
Only two reports of human embryo transfer following in vitro fertiliza-
tion appeared in the scientific literature before the birth of Louise Brown
in 1978. One occurred in Australia in 1973,21 and the other was reported
by Doctors Steptoe and Edwards in 1976.22 The embryo in the Australian
effort was aborted, and the patient of Doctors Steptoe and Edwards ex-
perienced a tubal pregnancy which required surgical removal.13
Steptoe and Edwards developed what amounts to a three stage proce-
dure: the recovery of an ovum, the fertilization and culturing of that
ovum in vitro, and the replacement of the resulting embryo into the
uterus of the patient from whom the ovum was obtained.2 4 This proce-
dure is still followed by Steptoe and Edwards, as well as by others who
have repeated their accomplishments.
25
Recovering the ovum is difficult; one of the difficulties results from its
small size. Doctors, therefore, recover the entire unruptured Graafian fol-
licle so that the follicle may rupture in the laboratory dish.26 Although
the first two documented births following in vitro fertilization and em-
bryo transfer were the result of procedures carried out in women with
natural or spontaneous ovulatory cycles,2 7 ovulation-inducing medication
may be given to increase the chances of surgical recovery of an unrup-
19. In 1890, Walter Heape reported in England that he had successfully transferred
rabbit embryos from the womb of one rabbit to that of another rabbit. Heape, Preliminary
Note on the Transplantation and Growth of Mammalian Ova with a Uterine Foster
Mother, 48 PROc. ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON 457-58 (1890), cited in Biggers, supra note 12, at
337.
20. The many claims by others of earlier in vitro fertilization were equivocal. The micro-
scopic technology, for instance, could not at that time have provided adequate visualization
to ascertain that a sperm had in fact penetrated the ovum. Biggers, supra note 12, at 337
(citing Chang, Fertilization of Rabbit Ova In Vitro, 184 NATURE 466-67 (1959)).
21. DeKretzer, Dennis, Hudson, Leeton, Lopata, Outch, Talbot, and Wood, Transfer of a
Human Zygote, 2 LANcET 728-29 (1973).
22. Steptoe & Edwards, Reimplantation of a Human Embryo with Subsequent Tubal
Pregnancy, 1 LANCET 880, 882 (1976).
23. Id.
24. See Steptoe & Edwards, supra note 1, at 366. See also Biggers, supra note 12, at 337.
25. Biggers, supra note 12, at 338. See also Eastern Virginia Medical School, Dep't of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, The VIP Program (rev. Apr. 1, 1982) (Protocol for Vital Initia-
tion of Pregnancy Program) [hereinafter cited as VIP Program].
26. Trounson, Leeton, Wood, Webb & Wood, Pregnancies in Humans by Fertilization In
Vitro and Embryo Transfer in the Controlled Ovulatory Cycle, 212 SCIENCE 681 (1981).
27. Id. at 682.
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tured follicle and thus the chances of the implantation of an embryo.2"
The recovery of the follicle must be done surgically, usually by laparos-
copy.29 After one or more eggs are obtained, they must be fertilized in the
laboratory in vitro.3 0 Sperm is obtained from the husband and the fertili-
zation attempt takes place in an incubator in a plastic dish containing a
culture medium. Development is allowed to proceed for about forty-eight
hours.31 Just as in the coital situation, sometimes fertilization may not
occur when the sperm and ovum meet. Sometimes, also, just as in the
normal situation, development will begin and then cease.
32
The embryo that has developed normally for forty-eight hours must be
transferred into the uterus. This is a simple procedure by which a small
catheter is used to convey the embryo through the cervical canal into the
uterus. Anesthesia is not required.3 If implantation occurs, and the preg-
nancy continues, then the attempt is considered to have been a success.
Since fertile couples typically require an average of three ovulatory cycles
to achieve pregnancy, it cannot be expected that pregnancy will result
from in vitro fertilization on the first attempt - especially when the inef-
ficiencies of the extracorporeal process are considered.' Hormones may
be administered to help nurture the pregnancy in its early stages since
the natural process of doing so has been interrupted.3 5
C. Ethical Concerns
In vitro fertilization and embryo transfer raise several ethical issues
which have been debated fervently in both the scientific literature" and
the mass media.3 7 Because of the controversy, the former Department of
28. Id. See also VIP Program, supra note 25, at 5.
29. Sometimes, because of earlier operations or disease, the ovaries may not be reached
by laparoscope. An open operation or laparotomy can be used to alleviate this problem so
that subsequent ovum aspiration attempts may be made by laparoscopy. VIP Program,
supra note 25, at 4-5.
30. In vitro means "in glass." Actually, plastic, flat dishes are used. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. See also Biggers, supra note 12, at 339 (stating that after exposure to
spermatazoa, the probability of fertilization of an ovum is 84%).
33. VIP Program, supra note 25, at 5.
34. Id. at 7. See also Biggers, supra note 12, at 338. In women who are reproducing natu-
rally there is only a 20-25% chance of a live birth occurring after an ovum has been exposed
to spermatazoa. Id.
35. VIP Program, supra .note 25, at 6. In the normal process of fertilization, the early
pregnancy is nurtured by the corpus luteum which is a small gland which develops at the
site of the follicle where the egg previously matured. There is concern that the corpus lu-
teum may have its development hindered when the follicle is aspirated. The development of
the corpus luteum is monitored, and hormones are given as necessary. Id.
36. See, e.g., Evans & Dixler, supra note 3, at 2324.
37. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 7, at 10; Moore, supra note 10, at 442; To Fool (Or
Not) with Mother Nature, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 69 [hereinafter cited as Mother Nature].
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Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health and
Human Servicis) in 1975 imposed a moratorium on federal funding of
human in vitro fertilization research until the issues that had been raised
could be examined further. In 1978, hearings were held resulting in the
Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare announcing that it would support the ethics of allowing federal fund-
ing of in vitro fertilization research. The support was conditioned on the
proviso that reimplantation of the embroyo would be made only into the
woman from whom the ovum was obtained.3 s
The ethical issues raised by the procedure include: Is the possibility of
creating and destroying human lives in the laboratory moral? Will the
offspring be genetically normal; and, if not, is it proper to even attempt to
use IVF? Will IVF produce changes in the natural patterns of human
reproduction? Finally, what are the considerations if IVF leads to genetic
engineering?39
With regard to the possible creation and destruction of human beings,
concern has been voiced over the prospect that ova will be fertilized, cre-
ating human life in the minds of some, and that subsequently some or all
of these embryos will be destroyed,40 thus raising the issue of abortion
and causing concern to those opposing abortion, in particular the Right to
Life Organization. 41 Their concern seems misplaced, however, because
current in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer techniques provide for
all normal embryos to be transferred to the womb of the donor.4'2 LeRoy
Walters, director of the Center for Bioethics at the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics, has stated that a consensus on the status of the early embryo is
38. See text accompanying notes 120-22 infra for the specific conditions imposed. See
also Evans & Dixler, supra note 3, at 2324. See also EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,057
(stating that their conclusion "relates to the ethics of conducting research involving in vitro
fertilization... ; it does not address the question of Department support of such research").
39. Biggers, supra note 12, at 336.
40. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues
Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEO. L.J. 1295, 1295-96 (1979).
41. See Tucker, In Vitro Veritas, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 1981, at 14, 15. Tucker illus-
trates the heated exchange between IVF advocates and opponents:
In response to the opponents of in vitro fertilization, infertile couples have formed
lobbying groups of their own. Barbara Menning, who in 1973 founded a group called
Resolve, to support fertility research, complains that opposition to in vitro fertiliza-
tion is "invariably stated by women and men who have achieved their families, or
celibate clergy for whom it is not an issue. Right-to-lifers and others stand up at
meetings and give among their credentials the number of children they have borne. In
my opinion, and in the opinion of other infertile women, the fact that they have
achieved their families disqualifies them from any understanding of the pain of
childlessness."
Id. at 16 (quoting Barbara Menning).
42. VIP Program, supra note 25, at 10. "In the event more than 1 egg is fertilized, all
fertilized eggs will be transferred into the uterus so that there would be the possibility of
developing twins or even triplets under this circumstance." Id.
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not needed due to the fact that no normal embryos are discarded. He sees
the only morally relevant difference between in vivo and in vitro fertiliza-
tion as being that in the laboratory the embryos can be examined for
abnormalities. 43 A decision not to transfer a grossly abnormal embryo
would be similar to a decision not to use heroic means to prolong the life
of an infant with serious birth defects."'
Concern has been expressed that IVF will cause an increase in the nat-
ural incidence of abnormalities through augmentation of chromosomal
aberrations - possibly caused in fertilization by abnormal sperm that
could not have reached the ovum in vivo.4 5 The increased rate of fertiliza-
tion by abnormal sperm could be a result of chemical and physical factors
in the laboratory procedure itself"6 and could possibly result from over-
whelming the ovum's natural block to polyspermic penetration.47 Fortu-
nately, nature protects the species by spontaneously aborting most chro-
mosomally anomalous embryos. Cellular development studies of
spontaneous human abortuses show in fact that chromosomal abnormali-
ties are a major cause of embryonic and fetal loss. 48 A recent study
reached the conclusion that 40 to 50 percent of human embryos that have
successfully implanted naturally may have a chromosomal abnormality
which causes them to abort.49 There is no reason to expect that the natu-
ral loss of these embryos would not occur following in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer, as the evidence indicates that the danger of in-
creased congenital defects is not high.50
This evidence, however, is not sufficient for those who argue that infer-
tile women and their unborn children should not be used for experimen-
tation. They argue that the safety of these procedures has not been de-
termined and that it cannot be determined through animal experimenta-
43. Holden, Ethicist Approves Test-Tube Baby Research, 215 SCIENcE 382, 382 (1982).
44. Id.
45. Biggers, supra note 12, at 340-41.
In October, 1981, William Tucker, writing in The New Republic, noted that as of that
date only one baby born as a result of the IVF procedure had a birth defect-a congenital
heart defect. It was unknown if the defect related in any way to the manner of his concep-
tion; his twin sister was apparently normal. Tucker, supra note 41, at 15. At the time of
Tucker's article, eight IVF children had been born worldwide. Id. In December, 1982, it was
reported that of the 150 babies born by IVF since Louise Brown, this one defect was appar-
ently still the only one to have occurred. Clark, Witherspoon, Abramson, Shapiro, Gray, &
Zabarsky, Infertility: New Cures, New Hope, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1982, at 102, 103, and 108.
46. Biggers, supra note 12, at 340-41.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 340.
49. Id. (citing Schlesselman, How Does One Assess the Risk of Abnormalities from
Human In Vitro Fertilization?, 135 AM. J. OB. & GYN. 135, 148 (1979)).
50. Biggers, supra note 12, at 341. Biggers states that the risk seems much lower than
that taken by couples with a recessive defect who decide to have a child. Id.
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tion.51 An example used to show past scientific misjudgment is the pre-
scribing of the drug thalidomide, once thought to be harmless, which re-
sulted in the birth of thousands of babies with missing limbs. 52 Similarly,
and even more analogous to in vitro fertilization, was the administration
of the hormone diethylstilbestrol (DES) to pregnant women in the belief
that it was harmless and could prevent miscarriage. 53 About fifteen years
after birth, it became apparent that the daughters of these women had a
high risk of developing vaginal cancer." In both instances, the environ-
ment in which the embryos were developing was changed. It is felt that
manipulation of the environment of conception and early embryonic de-
velopment could have similar results.55
Ethical concerns have additionally been directed toward any changes in
the natural patterns of human reproduction in terms of the detrimental
effects such may have on marriage and the family.58 It has been suggested
that even if the initial goal of the clinical application of IVF is to assist
married couples in bearing children of their own, the technology already
provides the potential for ovum, embryo, and womb donation.57 It is be-
lieved by some commentators that the demand for these extramarital
uses will be strong and will ultimately compromise family, lineage, and
heterosexuality and weaken the taboos against adultery and incest.5 s
Stated differently, "We're on a slippery slope. Western society is built
around the family; once you divorce sex from procreation, what happens
to the family?
'59
The Roman Catholic Church, which has traditionally opposed artificial
advances in procreation and contraception, condemns all interference
with nature. Artificial insemination, even with the husband as the donor,
was condemned by Pope Pius XII on the ground that it converted the
home into a laboratory. 0 In vitro fertilization has been compared to
switching the marital bed into a chemistry set." Protestant theologian
51. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 11.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 11-12.
56. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045 (citing L. Kass, Ethical Issues in Human In
Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Research, and Embryo Transfer 15 (1978) (paper
prepared for the Ethics Advisory Board)).
57. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045 (citing Kass, supra note 56 parenthetical, at 15).
58. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045 (citing Kass, supra note 56 parenthetical, at 15).
59. Mother Nature, supra note 37, at 69 (quoting Robert J. Berry, British geneticist and
consultant to a board set up by the Church of England to consider issues such as the ones
raised by the birth of Louise Brown).
60. Mother Nature, supra note 37, at 69. See also, Hand, The Manipulation of Exis-
tence, 45 VrrAL SPEEcHEs DAY 98, 100 (1978).
61. Mother Nature, supra note 37, at 69 (quoting Rev. William B. Smith, a spokesman
for the Archdiocese of New York).
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Paul Ramsey, on the other hand, believes that it is the unnatural risk to
the child that makes the procedure immoral0 2
Acceptance of in vitro fertilization as recourse from infertility for mar-
ried couples, for whom it may well provide the only opportunity for a
child of their own, represents the more moderate view expressed by Jew-
ish religious leaders.63 Rabbi Seymour Siegel, professor of ethics at Man-
hattan's Jewish Theological Seminary, in commenting on the birth of
Louise Brown stated: "The Browns were trying to obey the command-
ment to have children. When nature does not permit conception, it is de-
sirable to try to outwit nature. The Talmud teaches that God desires
man's cooperation."'" It was stated to the Ethics Advisory Board that in-
voluntary infertility has traditionally been seen by Jewish religious lead-
ers to be a very serious matter: "The rabbis put it this way, some fifteen
centuries ago. Four are considered as if they were dead: the poor, the
diseased, the blind, and the childless. '6 5
Concern has been expressed that the genetic manipulation written
about in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World6" in 1932 might become com-
monplace as a result of this new technology.67 Some of the concerns ex-
pressed include:
1. The development of commercial ovum and embryo banks;6
2. The genetic selection or manipulation of early embryos;69
3. The transfer of nuclei from adult individuals to early embryos, or
cloning;70 and
4. Extracorporeal gestation, or bringing an embryo all the way to
viability in the laboratory.71
Some commentators have suggested that it would be best to evaluate
these potential consequences of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer
62. Id. (quoting Paul Ramsey, a theologian). See also Ramsey, Shall We "Reproduce?",
The Medical Ethics of In Vitro Fertilization, 220 J.A.M.A. 1346 (1972).
63. Mother Nature, supra note 37, at 69.
64. Id.
65. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045-46 (citing S. Leiman, Statement to the Ethics
Advisory Board 131 (Nov. 10, 1978), as printed in Transcript of Meeting V, Nat'l Tech.
Info. Serv., PB-288405).
66. A. HuxLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD (1946).
67. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at. 35,045.
68. Id. (citing Kass, supra note 56 parenthetical, at 19).
69. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045 (citing L. Walters, Ethical Issues in Human In
Vitro Fertilization and Research Involving Early Human Embryos n.113 (1978) (paper pre-
pared for the Ethics Advisory Board)).
70. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045 (citing Walters, supra note 69 parenthetical, at
n.113).
71. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045 (citing Walters, supra note 69 parenthetical, at
n.118).
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"from the standpoint of both likelihood and probable impact. '7 2 Others
believe that some of the fears of the latter group may be potential bene-
fits. One commentator views the surrogate motherhood role as closely
analogous to the role of a wet nurse and, therefore, has no ethical objec-
tion to extramarital involvement through gestation where intramarital re-
production would be impossible.7 3 Sex preselection,7 4 pre-transfer screen-
ing,75 retransfer repair of defects,7 6 and extracorporeal gestation7 are all
seen by some to be potential benefits.
A final ethical concern with regard to the appropriateness of allocating
scarce health care funds to the application of these techniques has been
expressed.7 8 In addressing this concern, however, it should be pointed out
that there are at present no federally supported human in vitro fertiliza-
tion clinics in the United States.79 The facility at Eastern Virginia Medi-
cal School is supported by private funds.80
II. LEGAL IssuEs ARISING FROM IVF
A. The Delzio Cases"
Delzio v. Presbyterian Hospital2 suggests the multitude of IVF legal
issues that may plague our courts in the future. Mrs. Delzio, a twenty-six
year old doctor's wife who was suffering from blocked Fallopian tubes,
had previously suffered several miscarriages. Two attempts at tubal re-
pair had failed. When Mrs. Delzio requested a third operation in 1972,
Dr. Landrum Shettles at Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital suggested that
she consider the possibility of undertaking in vitro fertilization and reim-
72. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,045 (citing S. Gorovitz, In Vitro Fertilization Sense
and Nonsense 14, 15 (1979) (paper prepared for the Ethics Advisory Board)).
73. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,042 (citing Leiman, supra note 65 parenthetical, at
126-30).
74. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,042 (citing Walters, supra note 69 parenthetical, at
n.112).
75. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,042 (citing Walters, supra note 69 parenthetical, at
n.113).
76. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,042 (citing Walters, supra note 69 parenthetical, at
n.115).
77. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,042 (citing Walters, supra note 69 parenthetical, at
n.118).
78. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 12. Hubbard feels that this research distorts health priori-
ties-stating that even in the United States many people do not have access to adequate
health care. Poor women are "coerced" not to have babies while women who can afford it
will pay to "become guinea pigs in the risky technology of in vitro fertilization." Id.
79. See Tucker, supra note 41, at 14.
80. See VIP Program, supra note 25, at 8 (advising IVF patients that it is doubtful that
their insurance will cover their costs).
81. Delzio v. Presbyterian Hosp., 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For medical information
regarding the Delzio case, see Sweeney & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 4-9.
82. 74 Civ. 3588.
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plantation if the next tubal repair failed."3
Since such a procedure had not been carried out by any known workers
in the field, there was an agreement that some of Mrs. Delzio's ova would
be collected and an attempt made at a "dry run" of the in vitro fertiliza-
tion process.8 Mrs. Delzio and her husband agreed that another attempt
at surgical repair of the Fallopian tubes would be made; and, at the same
time, ova would be procured and transported to Columbia-Presbyterian
Hospital Medical Center, where Dr. Shettles would attempt to fertilize
the ova with Dr. Delzio's sperm.8 5
This attempt at IVF was successful, but unfortunately, the tubal recon-
struction failed. The fertilized ova were allowed to run their natural
course in the culture media; and then, after they were no longer viable,
they were discarded.8 6
Having successfully completed the "dry run," the doctors reinstated
the plan to attempt IVF and reimplantation. In preparation, Mrs. Delzio
spent nearly a year determining her ovulatory pattern, so that the mature
ova could be harvested at the appropriate time.87 Finally, on September
12, 1973, Mrs. Delzio was taken to the operating room where follicular
fluid was aspirated from both ovaries. This fluid, along with some tubal
mucosa, was collected in a sterile container, then sealed and transported
by Dr. Delzio immediately to Dr. Shettles at Columbia-Presbyterian Hos-
pital Medical Center. Dr. Shettles immediately began the IVF culture of
the ovum. The culture medium containing ova, sperm, and tubal mucosa
was then placed into an incubator where it was to remain for an antici-
pated time of three days until it reached the blastula stage.88
On the second day of incubation, Dr. Shettles was informed by the
Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology that the Na-
tional Institute of Health banned IVF work, that such work was unethical
and immoral, that he [Shettles] was unqualified in the IVF field, and
moreover, that Columbia-Presbyterian had never approved such work. As
a consequence, the IVF project was terminated; and the blastocyst
83. See Sweeney & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4-5. During this year, Mrs. Delzio suffered further medical complications. She
over-responded to a dose of the drug clomothene citrate which had been given in an attempt
to make her ovulate and to produce more than one ovum for the IVF attempt, and conse-
quently she developed a large ovarian cyst. Id. The most common fertility medication given
at this time in the United States is clomiphene citrate (clomid). Telephone interview with
Peggy Glessner, Virginia Drug Information Center, Medical College of Virginia Hospitals,
Richmond, Virginia (Apr. 15, 1983). See also PHysiscuNs' DEsK REFERENCE at 1350, 1886 (J.
Angel, Publisher, 37th ed. 1983).
88. Sweeney & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 5.
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destroyed."'
The following morning, Mrs. Delzio, still in severe postoperative pain,
was informed of the project termination, and understandably became
emotionally distraught. She succumbed to a profound depression which
still persisted in April of 1980.90
Litigation was commenced on the theory that there had been unlawful
destruction of property with the result that plaintiffs suffered mental
anguish for loss of the potential child.9 1 The jury awarded Mrs. Delzio
$50,000 compensatory damages for mental suffering, but ruled in favor of
the defendants on the conversion claim.
9 2
This case graphically illustrates the abundance of legal issues surround-
ing IVF. What constitutional rights do the respective parties have? Who
has the legal right to institute or terminate an IVF procedure? What lia-
bilities attach when sperm, ova, or a fertilized ovum is injured, destroyed,
mixed up, or lost during the IVF procedure? Who is liable if the woman
who supplied the ova is a carrier for hemophilia, or either donor carries
the gene for Tay-Sachs disease? Finally, how are these liabilities changed
when a third-party donor ovum, sperm, or womb is employed?9 3
B. Federal Law
At present, no state or federal statutes address the subject of in vitro
fertilization. Instead, one must rely for guidance upon the federal regula-
tions promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to protect human subjects involved in research conducted or
funded by that Department.9 4 The regulations provide generally that any
HHS grant or contract supporting research, development, and related ac-
tivities involving human in vitro fertilization be reviewed by a local Insti-
tutional Review Board.9 5 It is the responsibility of this Board to consider
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 11.
93. The strongest case for a fundamental right to IVF probably exists when the semen
and ova are donated by the husband and wife, the blastocyst is implanted in the wife, and
procreation would otherwise be impossible for the particular couple by any means other
than IVF. Legal, moral, and ethical considerations understandably multiply when the IVF
procedure is unnecessary or when a third party's sperm, ovum, or womb is introduced into
the procedure.
94. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1982). In September, 1980, the National Commission for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (hereinafter referred to as
the Commission) informed the Secretary of Health and Human Resources that the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Resources lacked the statutory authority to require institutions
to follow the department's regulations and procedures for reviewing research that was not
supported by department funds. 47 Fed. Reg. 13,272, 13,275 (1982).
95. 45 C.F.R. § 46.205.
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how research subjects are selected, to insure that informed consent is ob-
tained from potential research subjects, and to monitor research activities
for the development of any unanticipated risks. 6 The regulations also re-
quire that no activity be undertaken until "appropriate studies on ani-
mals and nonpregnant individuals have been completed. 97 The only spe-
cific requirement relating to human in vitro fertilization is that "[n]o
application or proposal involving human in vitro fertilization may be
funded by the Department or any component thereof until the applica-
tion or proposal has been reviewed by the Ethical Advisory Board and the
Board has rendered advice as to its acceptability from an ethical
standpoint."' 8
The history of federal involvement in this area extends back almost a
decade. On November 16, 1973, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) published a draft document outlining proposed poli-
cies and procedures for the protection of human subjects involved in re-
search. This document represented the work of a special study commit-
tee appointed by HEW through the National Institute of Health.100 The
draft policy declared that care had to be taken "not to bring human ova
fertilized in vitro to viability-whether in the laboratory or implanted in
the uterus-until the safety of the technique [had] been demonstrated as
far as possible in sub-human primates." 10 1 It was, therefore, proposed
that: (1) all research proposals involving human in vitro fertilization be
reviewed by an Ethical Review Board;102 (2) no research involving the im-
plantation of laboratory-fertilized human ova into recipient females be
supported until appropriate scientific review boards were convinced that
sufficient experiments with animals, including sub-human primates, had
been conducted to demonstrate the safety of the technique;103 and (3) no
implantation of in vitro fertilized human ova be attempted until guide-
lines had been developed to govern the responsibilities of the donor and
recipient "parents" and of research institutions and personnel.04
The following year, in July, 1974, the National Commission for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the
Commission) was established by the National Research Service Award
96. Id. § 46.205(a)( 2). For a performance evaluation of Institutional Review Boards gener-
ally, see 47 Fed. Reg. 13,272 (1982).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(1).
98. Id. § 46.204(d).
99. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,743 (1973).
100. On October 9, 1973, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare announced the appointment of this study group. 38 Fed. Reg. at 27,882.
101. 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,738.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Requirement 3 does not appear in the subsequent regulations and guidelines.
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Act.10 5 The Commission's purpose was to study research involving human
fetuses, to make recommendations to the Secretary of HEW regarding
the funding of such research projects, and, if a positive recommendation
for funding was forthcoming, to determine under what conditions such
funding should occur.10 6
Coincidental with the creation of the Commission and before any re-
port could be issued by it, HEW published a set of proposed regulations
for the protection of human subjects on August 23, 1974.17 These regula-
tions defined the term "fetus" to include "the product of in vitro fertiliza-
tion which is subsequently implanted in the donor of the ovum."'' 08 In
addition, the regulations provided the Ethics Advisory Board with guide-
lines for evaluating research proposals submitted to it:
With respect to the fertilization of human ova in vitro, it is expected that
the Board will consider the extent to which current technology permits the
continued development of such ova, as well as the legal and ethical issues
surrounding the initiation and disposition of such products of research.
With respect to implantation of fertilized human ova, it is expected that
the Board will consider such factors as the safety of the technique (with
respect to offspring) as demonstrated in animal studies and clarification of
the legal responsibilities of the donor and recipient parent(s) as well as the
research personnel.109
No effort was made, however, to protect the products of in vitro fertiliza-
tion prior to implantation, the rationale being that biomedical research
had not yet neared the point of being able to sustain these products for
any substantial period of time.110
On August 8, 1975, HEW issued its final regulations for the protection
of human subjects following review of both public comment on the pro-
posed regulations and the Commission's report and recommendations
pertaining to fetal research. 1 The Commission's report, however, did not
directly address in vitro fertilization and/or embryo transfer. Accordingly,
HEW decided not to impose any substantive regulations upon such re-
search, choosing instead to reiterate the procedural requirement that no
105. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, §§ 93-348, 201-
215, 88 Stat. 342, 348-54, as amended by Emergency Medical Services Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-573, § 18(a), 90 Stat. 2709, 2719 (codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. § 289e-1
(1982)).
106. § 202(b), 88 Stat. at 350.
107. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1982)).
108. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648. The proposed definition of fetus included only those circum-
stances where the in vitro fertilized ovum was returned from its donor, thus excluding from
the definition those situations where an in vitro fertilized ovum was implanted in one other
than the donor. For the present definition of fetus, see infra note 114.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1982).
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proposal be funded until it could be reviewed by the Ethics Advisory
Board to determine its acceptability from an ethical standpoint. " 2 Also,
in the proposed regulations, no effort was made to address the issue of
nonimplanted fetuses based upon the state of the art in biomedical re-
search at the time.113 The regulations as they presently exist, therefore,
only apply to implanted products of in vitro fertilization. " "
The Ethics Advisory Board established by these 1975 regulations was
not actually appointed until 1977 when it became necessary for the Board
to consider Dr. Soupart's application for a research grant to study in vitro
fertilization."" Shortly after the Board's receipt of this application, Lou-
ise Brown was born;116 and, as a result, the Secretary of HEW asked the
Board to expand its consideration of the application to include the ethi-
cal, legal, scientific, and social issues involved in human in vitro fertiliza-
tion and embryo transfer. " After more than six months of investigation,
the Ethics Advisory Committee issued its report to then Secretary of
HEW, Patricia Harris.118
As noted previously, the Ethics Advisory Board recommended federal
support of research involving human in vitro fertilization and embryo
transfer," 9 concluding that such support was ethically acceptable under
certain conditions. 20 Among these conditions were the following: (1) no
embryos would be sustained in vitro more than fourteen days after fertili-
zation, the stage normally associated with completion of implantation; 21
and (2) embryo transfers would be attempted only with gametes received
from lawfully married couples. 22 In addition, the Ethics Advisory Board
adopted the position that further animal research be undertaken, particu-
larly with primates, to assess the risks to mothers and offspring associ-
ated with in vitro procedures. 23 Although Secretary Harris solicited pub-
112. Id. § 46.204(d).
113. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,527 (1975).
114. Pregnancy is defined as encompassing "the period of time from confirmation of im-
plantation . . . until expulsion or extraction of the fetus." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(b) (1982).
Fetus is defined as "the product of conception from the time of implantation ... until a
determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the fetus, that is viable." Id. §
46.203(c). Note that one commentator has asked: "By excluding from the definition of preg-
nancy the area between conception and implantation, has not the Commission and HEW
legitimated in vitro fertilization by defining it as an area involving the non-human?" Horan,
Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation, 22 Vn.L. L. Rav. 325, 328 (1977).
115. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,047.
116. Id. at 35,033-34.
117. Id. at 35,033.
118. Id. at 35,034.
119. Id. at 35,057.
120. Id. at 35,056.
121. Id. at 35,057.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 35,056.
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lic comment on the report, 24 she took no action on it before leaving
office.
Since there are no federal statutes in effect to regulate IVF, one must
currently rely on HEW regulations, proposals advanced by the Ethics Ad-
visory Board, and analogous state laws when confronted with legal ques-
tions involving the in vitro procedures.
C. State Regulation
Although no state has yet enacted legislation dealing specifically with
IVF, two existing areas of state law touch on relevant legal considera-
tions;125 however, both of these types of statutes were developed before
the realization of a human IVF birth. 28 Consequently, an interpretation
of this legislation broad enough to encompass the IVF legal concerns may
not be feasible.
The first variety of pertinent legislation concerns artificial insemina-
tion,127 for which approximately one-third of the states have passed stat-
utes.1 28 A number of these statutes require the written consent of the hus-
band to be recorded,229 and some specifically state that sperm donors 30
124. Id. at 35,033.
125. Id. at 35,047.
126. Id.
127. For further information on artificial insemination, see Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Sha-
piro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 585, 586 (1979).
128. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1975); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (West Cum. Supp.
1982); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to -69n (West
1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-101.1, -9904
(1981); IA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp.
1983); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824
(1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1981); NEv. REv. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
8H 551-553 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, .243, .247, and 677.355,
.360, .365, .370, .990 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-446 (Cum. Supp. 1982); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-2-103 (1977).
129. CAL. C-Tv. CODE § 7005 (West Cum. Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69h
(West 1981); Ki. STAT. ANN. § 23-130 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1981); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 8 553 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83); OR.
REv. STAT. § 677.365 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 26.26.050 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 891.40 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83).
130. Artificial insemination would be necessary if the husband were sterile; however, ethi-
cal and moral principles must be considered before utilizing a donor sperm in IVF for rea-
sons other than sterility of the husband. For example, should donor sperm be used if the
husband is sick or away at war, or if the couple is divorced or separated? Suppose the po-
tential parents want to produce a child of above average intelligence, or with particular
physical characteristics such as red hair, etc. Would society permit use of a sperm bank in
such a situation? To date, there are no laws regulating such practices.
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are relieved of all obligations and rights to the child.' Ten states require
that artificial insemination be administered by a licensed physician."32
The Georgia statute relieves the doctor of all civil liability to the hus-
band, wife, or child unless the insemination procedure was negligently ad-
ministered."83 If donor sperm is to be used, Oregon statutes require the
physician to select the specimen of an individual who is not afflicted with
a genetic defect or venereal disease."'
On the question of legitimacy, Virginia Code section 64.1-7.1,"s ' like
similar statutes in other states," mandates that children conceived by
artificial insemination be presumed for all purposes to be legitimate."37
These statutes become valuable guidelines when questions of inheritance
or paternity arise. Since these statutes were not adopted with IVF in
mind, however, courts may be reluctant to apply these principles to
problems presented by IVF.
A second area of related law is suggested by fetal experimentation stat-
utes. 38 Since these statutes were drafted with abortion in mind, their ap-
plicability to IVF experimentation is uncertain."s9
131. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Cum. Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69j
(West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1981); NEv. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); OI.
REv. STAT. § 109.239 (1981); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83).
132. ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1975); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Cum. Supp. 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69g (West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-101.1, -9904 (1981);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1981); NEV. REv. STAT., § 126.061 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, §§ 551, 553 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.360 (1981); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-7.1 (Rep. Vol. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83).
133. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1(b) (1981).
134. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 677.360, .370 (1981).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
136. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69i (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11
(West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40
(West Supp. 1983).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (RepL. Vol. 1980).
138. Medical experiments performed on a viable fetus of course constitute unethical prac-
tice. The regulations are worded in such a way, however, that the product of in vitro fertili-
zation prior to actual implantation and viability does not seem to be within the definition of
fetus and, therefore, seems to fall outside the scope of the regulations entirely. See supra
note 114 for the language giving rise to this implication.
139. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (Supp. 1982-83); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
81-26 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns RepL. VoL
1979); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West
1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685 to
.2692 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037
(Vernon Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 to -02 (Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Baldwin 1981); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605 (Purdon 1977); S. D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978).
Whether these restrictions extend to IVF experimentation may depend on whether under
state law the terms of the particular statute would be found to encompass ex utero
blastocysts.
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D. Constitutional Considerations Concerning IVF Regulation
To determine whether a state may regulate the IVF procedures, one
must first determine whether a fundamental right is being affected. Are
prospective parents entitled to employ IVF as a constitutional right?
Such a privilege is not explicitly guaranteed by the United States Consti-
tution and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. If IVF privi-
leges are found by the Court to be implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, courts would have to examine with "strict scrutiny" any attempts to
impinge on that right, and the state would be required to demonstrate a
"compelling state purpose" and utilize the least restrictive means of
achieving that purpose before such regulations would be upheld. 140
1. Marriage and Family Relationships
The marriage relationship has been regarded by the Supreme Court as
involving a "fundamental" interest."1 Consequently, laws interfering with
this relationship must be justified by reason of a compelling state
interest.14
In Loving v. Virginia,43 the Supreme Court held invalid a state statute
forbidding interracial marriage on equal protection grounds, also holding
that the interracial couple had been denied liberty without due process of
law. The Court, in discussing due process, described marriage as a "basic"
right that was "fundamental to our very existence and survival.' 44
The fundamental nature of the family relationship was also recognized
in Boddie v. Connecticut,45 in the context of procedural due process, and
in Zablocki v. Redhail,"46 which invalidated a state statute restricting
parents with support obligations to minor children from marrying with-
out court approval. 7 The Court in Meyer v. Nebraska"8 found among
the rights of "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment "the
right.., to marry, establish a home and bring up children. '" 49 Finally,
the constitutional right to rear one's children was recognized in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters'5" and in Prince v. Massachusetts.'5'
140. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See also EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,048.
141. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
142. Id. See also text accompanying note 140.
143. 388 U.S. 1.
144. Id. at 10.
145. 401 U.S. 371 (1970).
146. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
147. Id. at 390-91. The Zablocki decision was decided on equal protection grounds. Id.
148. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
149. Id. at 399.
150. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Court stated that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
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These cases may support a constitutionally protected right to avail one-
self of the benefits of the IVF procedure through the implicitly guaran-
teed right of privacy, particularly with respect to marriage and children.
Such an analysis may, however, be questioned in view of dictum in the
Zablocki opinion which warns that not all regulations affecting marriage
need be subjected to strict scrutiny.152 "[R]easonable regulations that do
not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital rela-
tionship may legitimately be imposed.'' 1 5
2. Procreation, Contraception, and Abortion
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 2 procreation was recognized by the Su-
preme Court as "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."15' The Skinner Court invalidated an Oklahoma state law which
provided for the sterilization of three-time convicted felons, but excepted
from its coverage persons who had been convicted of certain types of
white collar felonies such as bribery and embezzlement. 156 The Court held
that because the interest in procreation was a "basic civil right,' 57 it
could not be taken away by the state without the compelling justification
required by a strict scrutiny analysis.15 8
Subsequent cases dealing with regulation of contraception arose in the
1960's and 1970's. Embodied in these cases is the concept of a right to
privacy. The leading case establishing a constitutional right to privacy is
Griswold v. Connecticut,159 in which the Supreme Court held invalid a
state law prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices. The scope of the
decision was sufficiently broad to apply to "aiders and abettors" who op-
erated a birth control clinic.10 The Court reasoned that the right of mari-
tal privacy was protected from governmental intrusion under the penum-
bra of guarantees in the Bill of Rights.' 6'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg discussed the ninth amend-
ment'62 which reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
151. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court referred to the "parent's claim to authority in her
own household and in the rearing of her children . . . [as one of several] sacred private
interests." Id. at 165. The Court balanced the parents right against the state's interest in
protecting the welfare of children. Id.
152. 434 U.S. at 386.-
153. Id.
154. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
155. Id. at 541.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
160. Id. at 481.
161. Id. at 484-86.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people. '16 3 Justice Goldberg observed that the ninth amendment was not
so much an independent source of constitutional rights as a recognition
that the Bill of Rights does not represent an exclusive list of such
rights. 16' The right of privacy, the Court said, was one example of a "ba-
sic and fundamental right not expressly enumerated."'' 65 It would be a
violation of this right to permit governmental intrusion into the marital
bedroom to search for evidence of violation of the Connecticut anti-con-
traceptive law since the marriage relationship lay within the zone of con-
stitutionally protected privacy.161
The rationale of the Griswold case was argued to the Supreme Court in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,6 7 a case in which the Court held a Massachusetts
statute banning the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
unconstitutional. 6 8 Although Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection
grounds, the Court, nonetheless, stated that "if the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'6 9
This language in the Eisenstadt opinion appears to give strong support
to the existence of a fundamental right to utilize IVF. If the Court is
willing to support an individual's right to use artificial means to prevent a
pregnancy, it would logically follow that the same Court would advocate
an individual's constitutional privilege to use artificial means to promote
a pregnancy.
This same line of reasoning is supported by Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International.70 In striking down as unconstitutional a New York
statute that regulated the distribution and advertisement of contracep-
tives, the Carey Court observed:
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of
this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a par-
ticularly important place in the history of the right of privacy, a right first
explicitly recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives,. . . and most prominently vindicated
163. 381 U.S. at 488.93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 488-90.
165. Id. at 491.
166. Id. at 495.
167. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
168. Id. at 454-55. The Court avoided a decision on the claimed right of privacy, holding
instead that the state law violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
by "providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons." Id. Eisenstadt il-
lustrates the overlap of the privacy and equal protection guarantees.
169. Id. at 453 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
170. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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in recent years in the context of contraception . . . and abortion .... 7
The Court stated that "the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State. '172
Finally, in Roe v. Wade 7 3 the Supreme Court stated that the right of
privacy was "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty and restrictions upon state action" 174 and that the right was
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate her
pregnancy.7
5
Whether the Court would deem the right of privacy broad enough to
encompass a couple's decision to employ the IVF procedure is uncertain.
Recent decisions based on the right of privacy which examine governmen-
tal intrusions relating to marriage, procreation, and family relationships
by the strict scrutiny standard might well support a ruling that state reg-
ulation of IVF and embryo transfer would intrude upon a fundamental
right. As a result, any statute affecting this method of begetting children
would have to serve a compelling state interest and do so by the least
restrictive means.
E. Funding
Although the finding of a fundamental right to IVF implicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution might prohibit a governing unit from prohibiting
IVF procedures, significant influence might still be exerted by the govern-
ment's refusal to fund such projects. Recent cases have recognized a
state's right to encourage childbirth rather than abortion by upholding
statutes that provided state funding for hospital services associated with
childbirth, but not nontherapeutic abortions. In 1977, the Supreme Court
held in Maher v. Roe,'7 6 Poelker v. Doe,'7 7 and Beat v. Doe 7 8 that equal
171. Id. at 685.
172. Id. at 687. See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), where the
Court recognized that a man has a constitutional right to father and enjoy the association of
his offspring. The Court held, however, that a state could not require a husband's consent to
an abortion performed during the first trimester of pregnancy, reasoning that a woman's
principal role in childbearing justifies her right to act unilaterally during that period. Id. at
69-71.
Justices Stewart and Powell, in a concurring opinion, maintained that a man's right to
father children is constitutionally protected. Id. at 90. They agreed with the majority, how-
ever, that a woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy outweighs the husband's
interest in fatherhood. Id.
But see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (state law requiring mother's but
not father's consent to adoption of illegitimate child violates equal protection clause).
173. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
174. Id. at 153.
175. Id.
176. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
177. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
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protection did not require a state to finance elective abortions even
though the state did subsidize indigent women for the expenses of child-
birth. In Maher, Connecticut's Medicaid program limiting state funding
for first trimester abortions to those that were "medically necessary" 179
was attacked on equal protection grounds. Finding no suspect class or
fundamental right, the Court applied a minimum rationality standard
and upheld the funding scheme. Justice Powell noted that the Constitu-
tion "imposes no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related
medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical
expenses of indigents. '1 80
The Court in Poelker relied on the approach of Maher to reject an at-
tack on the ban on elective abortions in the public hospitals of St. Louis.
The St. Louis policy stemmed both from the staffing practices at the pub-
lic hospital involved, which used doctors and students from the medical
school of a Jesuit-operated university, and from directions by the mayor,
who was morally opposed to abortion. The majority found no constitu-
tional significance in the mayor's personal hostility to abortions.'8s The
Court concluded: "[T]he Constitution does not forbid a state or city, pur-
suant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal
childbirth .... 182
Justice Powell's majority opinion in BeaI'83 emphasized that the federal
Medicaid law"4 "confers broad discretion on the States to adopt stan-
dards for determining the extent of medical assistance, requiring only
that such standards be 'reasonable" and 'consistent with the objectives' of
the Act."'8 5 In Beal, the Pennsylvania version of Medicaid limited
financial assistance for abortions to those "certified by physicians as med-
ically necessary." 188 Justice Powell found no inconsistency between the
Pennsylvania restriction and the objectives of federal law: "Although seri-
ous statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan ex-
cluded necessary medical treatment from its coverage, it is hardly incon-
sistent with the objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund
unnecessary-though perhaps desirable-medical services."' 8 7
178. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
179. Maher, 432 U.S. at 466.
180. Id. at 469.
181. Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521.
182. Id.
183. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
184. Title XIX, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396K (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
This statute expressly provides that "[a] State plan for medical assistance must.., include
reasonable standards ... for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance
under the plan which ... are consistent with the objectives of this [Title] . "42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17) (1976).
185. Beal, 432 U.S. at 444.
186. Id. at 441.
187. Id. at 444-45 (emphasis in original).
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These cases would thus support governmental refusal to fund IVF re-
search and clinical application and would probably allow the governmen-
tal unit to restrict recipients of the funds to married couples or to persons
incapable of producing offspring by natural means.
F. Substantive Causes of Action Sounding in Tort
The anticipated growth of private IVF clinics across the country means
that an ever-increasing number of otherwise infertile couples will now be
able to try the procedure.188 The result will be greater exposure to liabil-
ity for doctors and hospitals, thus increasing the likelihood of IVF-related
litigation in the future. Numerous causes of action already existing in tort
could arise in the IVF context. 18 9 In an attempt to address some of these
issues, this section will focus first on causes of action that could be
brought on behalf of an IVF child and then on actions which could be
brought to redress injuries to parents.
1. Suits on Behalf of a Child
a. Injuries Prior to Birth
A suit could be brought on behalf of a child born alive who is the prod-
uct of in vitro fertilization and who has sustained prenatal or even pre-
conception injuries. Today, virtually every jurisdiction which has consid-
ered the matter recognizes the right of a child to recover for damages
intentionally or negligently inflicted upon it prior to birth.190 The first
case to grant such a cause of action was Bonbrest v. Kotz, 19 1 holding that
a child who is born alive has standing to sue for torts inflicted after via-
bility but before birth.192 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would
leave a wronged individual without remedy under the law. 193
While Bonbrest represents the traditional rule, the trend has been to
recognize a cause of action on behalf of a child for injuries sustained any-
188. Since 1978, more than 120 babies have been conceived via in vitro fertilization proce-
dures. See Small Miracles of Love and Science, LIFE MAGAZINE, Nov. 1982, at 44.
189. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
190. Id.
191. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
192. Id. at 142. "Viability" has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as be-
ing when a fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial
aid." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). The concept of viability was important to the
Bonbrest court as a means of distinguishing Oliver Wendell Holmes' decision in Dietrich v.
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), the first recorded case involving the issue of prenatal
negligence. Dietrich held that an unborn child was a part of its mother and lacked standing
to maintain a suit; therefore, any injury sustained by the infant was only recoverable by the
mother. Id. Influential in the development of the viability standard was Justice Boggs whose
dissenting opinion in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, -, 56 N.E. 638, 640-42
(1900), favored recovery for an infant sustaining prenatal injuries.
193. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 141.
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time after conception.' 9 4 In rejecting viability as the test, some courts
have recognized the difficulty of applying such a standard,9 5 and have
noted that it is logically impossible to conclude "that a claim for an injury
inflicted prior to viability is any less meritorious than one sustained af-
ter."I' Rather, courts have chosen to rely upon a causation test to deter-
mine if the injury sustained is traceable to another's wrongful act.1 97
Although the Virginia courts have not had occasion to consider the per-
missibility of a cause of action on behalf of an infant for prenatal injuries,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia de-
clared its belief in Bolen v. Bolen9 s that Virginia courts would entertain
such a suit. 99 The court reasoned that if a child must endure life with
mental and physical handicaps proximately caused by another's negli-
gence, then fundamental notions of fairness require compensation.2 00 The
court further stated that the fact that an infant may become a ward of
the state or at the very least a substantial financial burden upon his par-
194. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Ishell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973); Simon v. Mullin, 34
Conn. Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (1977); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d
727 (1956); Daley v. Meier, 33 I1. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Torigian v. Water-
town News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967); Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718,
187 N.W.2d 218 (1971); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696
(1953); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76,
220 A.2d 222 (1966); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
See generally Note, Preconception Negligence: Reconciling an Emerging Tort, 56 GEo. L.J.
1239 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Preconception Negligence].
195. As noted by the court in Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 11. 2d 348, -, 367
N.E.2d 1250, 1252-53 (1977), viability is a relative matter which depends upon such factors
as the health of the mother and child, the stage of development, the weight and race of the
child, and available life sustaining techniques.
196. Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, -, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966). Indeed, as the court
noted in Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, -, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1977),
there is substantial medical authority to the effect that congenital structural defects caused
by conditions in the prenatal environment can only be sustained early in the pre-viable
stages of fetal development.
197. See, e.g., Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, -, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Sylvia v.
Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, -, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966).
198. 409 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Va. 1975).
199. The Bolen court distinguished the case of Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138,
169 S.E.2d 440 (1969), in which the Virginia Supreme Court refused to recognize a wrongful
death action brought by the estate of a stillborn infant because of its unwillingness to find
that an unborn child could maintain a common law action for personal injuries. The western
district court in Bolen observed that although Lawrence was supportive of the defendant's
position which argued against recovery for prenatal injuries, it was not dispositive since the
Lawrence court was construing the state's wrongful death statute. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. at
1373. Cf. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981). In Harman, the infant
plaintiff who sustained prenatal injuries was held not to be a "person" under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act and therefore was denied recovery. Id. at 801.
200. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. at 1373.
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ents supports such a suit.20 1 The facts of the Bolen case also suggest that
the court recognized a right of recovery for prenatal injuries sustained by
non-viable fetuses. In the case, doctors performed a tubal ligation upon
the twin plaintiffs' mother without first determining if she was pregnant,
thereby allegedly causing the twins' deformities.2 0 2 Had the twins been
viable, the mother's pregnancy would have been apparent.
These cases would indicate that a Virginia court faced with a plaintiff
conceived through the IVF process might grant recovery for injuries sus-
tained after conception. This conclusion is a logical extension of existing
law since the courts have no reason to treat IVF babies any differently
than babies conceived normally.
In recent years, a number of courts have also allowed recovery for pre-
conception injuries.20 3 The first case to consider the issue favorably, Jor-
gensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc.,20 relied upon a causation
theory in upholding the infant plaintiff's claim under Oklahoma law that
she suffered Down's syndrome because her mother's chromosomal struc-
ture was altered when, prior to conception, she took the defendant manu-
facturer's birth control pills. 205In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,20 6 the
Illinois Supreme Court relied upon a breach of duty theory in holding
that a child had a valid cause of action against a hospital and a physician
for injuries sustained due to a negligently administered blood transfusion
given to its mother several years prior to conception.20 7 The Renslow
court found, in essence, that a contingent prospective duty was owed to
the unconceived child who could foreseeably be harmed by the breach of
duty to the child's mother. 20 s In Bergstresser v. Mitchell,0 9 the Eighth
Circuit upheld a cause of action where the infant plaintiff alleged that his
brain-damaged condition occurred because it became necessary for doc-
tors to perform an emergency Caesarean section upon his mother prior to
term due to an occult rupture of her uterus caused by an earlier, negli-
gently performed Caesarean section.2 1 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied upon Renslow and Jorgensen as precedent and held that any
other decision would lead to a situation where there was a wrong without
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1371.
203. See generally Preconception Negligence, supra note 194. For a recent case denying a
cause of action for preconception injuries, see Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269,
429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
204. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
205. Id. at 239-40.
206. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
207. Id. at -, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
208. Id.
209. 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978).
210. Id. at 24.
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a remedy.21'
Both the conception and pre-conception cases could be argued as pre-
cedent in a suit brought by an infant plaintiff seeking damages for inju-
ries sustained during in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer. The plain-
tiff, however, would clearly need to establish a duty on the part of the
hospital and the physician and would need to demonstrate that the pro-
cedures utilized in the in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer resulted in
the injury alleged. As a practical matter, the problem of proving negli-
gence at the conception or pre-conception stage might be difficult, if not
impossible.
b. Wrongful Life
Another type of suit which might be brought on behalf of a child born
deformed or impaired is a wrongful life suit. In such a case, the child
essentially argues that he should not have been born. The theory relied
upon is that the physician's negligent failure to inform the child's parents
of a possible deformed birth prevents the parents from being able to
choose whether to have the child. The child argues that but for the inade-
quate advice, he would not have been born to experience the pain and
suffering attributable to his impaired state.2 12 Such a case could be
brought by an IVF child where, for example, the physician failed to test
for birth defects or serious illness or did so in a negligent manner, failed
to inform the parents of potential problems, or directed that a defective
blastocyst be implanted.
The courts have not been receptive to causes of action of this nature.2 13
211. Id. at 25.
212. See cases cited infra notes 213-34. For a discussion of the wide range of claims as-
serted in this area, see generally Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life,
31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1409 (1977); Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for 'Wrongful Life,' 1 IsRAEL
L. REv. 513 (1966), reprinted in 7 J. FAM. L. 465 (1967); Comment, "Wrongful Life"- The
Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv. 480 (1980).
Wrongful life suits such as those cited in this article are to be distinguished from "dissat-
isfied life" cases where illegitimate children seek damages for being stigmatized as bastards.
See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (healthy illegiti-
mate child born following negligently performed abortion denied recovery); Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963) (healthy illegitimate child denied recov-
ery for wrongful life); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885
(1966) (illegitimate child denied recovery against state for wrongful life where mother, who
was a state mental patient, was sexually assaulted); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215
N.W.2d 9 (1974) (illegitimate child did not state cause of action for damages on theory of
wrongful birth where mother was seduced and battered).
213. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980) (child born with
Down's syndrome denied recovery where doctor failed to advise and test mother for dis-
ease); Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (under
state law, recovery denied child born with Tay-Sachs disease following negligent testing);
Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (handicapped child denied re-
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Recovery has generally been denied on two grounds: (1) the perceived
impossibility of measuring damages;2 1' and (2) public policy
considerations. 215
The New Jersey decision in Gleitman v. Cosgrove21 6 is illustrative. In
Gleitman, the mother of the infant plaintiff contracted rubella during the
first trimester of her pregnancy. Although she advised her physician of
the illness, she was assured, despite medical knowledge to the contrary,
that there would be no harmful consequences.' 1  As a result of the ru-
bella, the plaintiff was born mentally retarded and suffered from serious
sight, speech, and hearing defects.21 8 In addressing the issue of damages,
the court declared:
This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the non-
existence of life itself. By asserting that he should not have been born, the
infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his al-
leged damages because of the impossibility of making the comparison re-
covery where Air Force doctors failed to properly diagnose and treat rubella); DiNatale v.
Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1982); Moore v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1981) (child
born with Larsen's syndrome following physician's failure to advise that disease was inherit-
able, denied recovery); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (mongoloid child
denied recovery where physician failed to inform 38-year old mother of prenatal diagnosis
by use of amniocentesis); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (child born
with birth defects denied recovery after failure of physician to advise mother with rubella of
possible consequences); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978) (recovery denied child born with Down's syndrome where physician failed to
advise mother of risks involved in conception after age 35); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (recovery granted child born with fatal kidney disease where physi-
cian advised mother who had previously had child with same disease that chance of disease
recurring was "practically nil"), modified sub. nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (recovery denied child); Stewart v. Long Island College
Hospital, 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972)
(recovery denied impaired child where hospital assured mother who had had rubella during
pregnancy that abortion unnecessary); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496
(1979) (recovery denied child born with crippling hereditary disease where parents sought to
prevent conception through father's sterilization and had tried to terminate the subsequent
pregnancy by a negligently performed abortion); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (deformed child denied recovery where doctor failed to diagnose
mother's rubella).
214. See, e.g., Gilder v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, -, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, -, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Speck v.
Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, -, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (1979).
215. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (D.S.C. 1980); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, -, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342,
__ 408 A.2d 496, 508 (1979).
216. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
217. Id. at -, 227 A.2d at 690.
218. Id.
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quired by compensatory remedies. 1 9
The court then proceeded to. stress the sanctity of human life.220
In denying damages based upon public policy considerations, the courts
have also noted that a child does not have a fundamental right to be born
a whole, functional human being221 and that life with or without handi-
caps is more precious than non-life.22 In view of this reasoning, it seems
unlikely that the courts will modify their stance and allow an IVF child to
recover damages on a theory of wrongful life. In Scales v. United
States,22 3 a three-year old child with severely damaged organs was denied
recovery against physicians who failed to test his mother for pregnancy
when she had German measles.2 24 The infant plaintiff had brought suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act based on alleged negligent treatment
of his mother during her Air Force basic training.225 The Fifth Circuit
reversed the decision of the lower court which had awarded damages and
held the claim barred under federal law, 228 notwithstanding the fact that
"the infant had an independent cause of action under state tort law. '227
Although the majority of decisions in other jurisdictions have uniformly
denied the child's right to maintain a wrongful life action, California has
dissented from the majority and has granted a limited recovery to an in-
jured child claiming damages for wrongful life.22 In Turpin v. Sortine,229
the Supreme Court of California examined the question whether a child
born with a hereditary affliction may maintain a tort action against a
medical care provider who - before the child's conception - negligently
failed to advise the child's parents of the hereditary condition, depriving
them of the opportunity to choose not to conceive the child.230 The Tur-
pin court concluded that while a plaintiff-child in a wrongful life action
may not recover general damages for being born impaired as opposed to
not being born at all, the child - like his or her parents - may recover
special damages for extraordinary expenses to treat the hereditary
219. Id. at , 227 A.2d at 692.
220. Id. at , 227 A.2d at 693.
221. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 801, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, -, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (1979).
222. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, -, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
223. 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982).
224. Id. at 971.
225. Id.
226. The court barred the claim because of the Feres doctrine, which states that the
United States is "not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen
where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." Id. at 972.
227. Id. at 970.
228. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 221, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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deafness. 31
The Turpin court further noted in dictum that it is incorrect to suggest
that impaired life is preferable to nonlife under all circumstances.3 2 In
support of this view, the court referred to a California statute which
granted adults the right to control decisions relating to the rendering of
their own medical care, including the decision to have life-sustaining pro-
cedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition.233
The court suggested that in cases more extreme in severity than the one
at bar, public policy supports the right of each individual to make his or
her own determination as to the relative value of life and death.2 4 The
Turpin court did not, however, indicate those afflictions which would be
worse than not being born at all.
2. Suits to Recover Damages for Parents
a. Wrongful Birth
It seems inevitable that the parents of a deformed or impaired child
who is produced by in vitro fertilization will eventually bring a wrongful
birth action claiming that had they been advised of the risks of having
such a child, they would have prevented conception or terminated the
pregnancy. 3 5 A number of the earlier cases which considered the issue,
such as Gleitman v. Cosgrove2"6 and Stewart v. Long Island College Hos-
pital,37 refused to recognize that parents in wrongful birth cases had
stated a legally cognizable cause of action. Underpinning these decisions
were public policy considerations involving the sanctity of human life.2 38
231. Id. at 232, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
232. Id. at 229, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Wrongful birth claims have been asserted not only where a doctor or hospital fails to
diagnose or warn parents of a genetic disease but also where abortions or sterilizations have
failed or there has been a negligent prescription of drugs which results in a pregnancy. See,
e.g., White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981) (parents granted limited re-
covery for pregnancy and birth-related costs where child born following negligent tubal liga-
tion); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (mother permitted
damages where negligently performed abortion resulted in birth); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (parents granted recovery where pharmacist negligently
filled prescription for birth control pills with tranquilizers); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (parents entitled to recovery for birth of child following negligent
vasectomy); Sala v. Tomlinson, 87 A.D.2d 670, 448 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1982) (mother granted
recovery for birth of a child following negligent sterilization). Contra LaPoint v. Shirley, 409
F. Supp. 118, 120-21 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (recovery by parents denied where abnormal child
born following negligent tubal ligation because court found birth of a deformed child not to
be a foreseeable consequence of negligent sterilization).
236. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
237. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
238. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at -, 227 A.2d at 693; Stewart, 35 A.D.2d at _ 313
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But since Roe v. Wade 2' 9 recognized a woman's unqualified right during
the first trimester to terminate a pregnancy, with a limited right to do so
thereafter, the courts have generally not hesitated to recognize wrongful
birth claims.2 40 As noted by the Federal District Court of South Carolina
in Phillips v. United States,241 which involved a physician's negligence in
failing to inform or test a Down's syndrome child's mother for the dis-
ease, "subsequent cases have suggested that failure to recognize 'wrongful
birth'. . . claims could impermissibly burden the constitutional rights in-
volved in conception, procreation, and other familial decisions. 2 42 The
Phillips court then went on to say that refusal to recognize such causes of
action would immunize individuals in the medical field giving inadequate
guidance to those choosing to exercise their constitutional right to abort a
fetus which, if born, would suffer genetic defects.2 43
The courts have been divided, however, on the nature of damages to be
awarded. Some courts have held that parents should only be allowed to
recover pecuniary expenses and have disallowed damages for emotional
suffering and mental distress.24 4 The grounds asserted for denying the lat-
N.Y.S.2d at 503. Note, however, that both Gleitman and Stewart preceded Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
239. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
240. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 475-76, 478 (7th Cir. 1981) (cause of ac-
tion recognized for wrongful birth of rubella syndrome child where there was a failure to
diagnose rubella and inform mother of consequences). See also Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (cause of action permitted parents where
child born with Tay-Sachs following negligent testing of fetus); DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409
So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (recognized cause of action on behalf of parents for
birth of handicapped child due to defendant's prenatal negligence); Moore v. Lucas, 405 So.
2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (cause of action stated where mother who gave birth
to child with Larsen's syndrome advised disease not inheritable); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, -, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979) (cauie of action granted parents of mongoloid daughter
where doctors failed to inform 38-year old mother of amniocentesis test); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 386 N.E.2d 807, -, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978) (recog-
nized cause of action on behalf of parents of child born with Down's syndrome where doctor
failed to advise 37-year old mother of risks involved in becoming pregnant after age 35);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (recognized mother's cause of action
where defective child born after doctor failed to diagnose rubella); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, -, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975) (parents granted cause of action
where child born with rubella syndrome following doctor's failure to diagnose German mea-
sles in pregnant mother).
241. 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981).
242. Id. at 550.
243. Id. (citing Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979)).
244. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 479 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents can recover for
costs of birth and resultant expenses, including costs of raising child); DiNatale v. Lieber-
man, 409 So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (recovery for extraordinary care of child
permissible); Moore v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (parents
granted past and future medical expenses for extraordinary care necessary to treat child's
abnormalities); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895, 901 (1978) (recovery by parents for continued care and treatment of child with Down's
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ter include the inability to calculate such damages and the belief that the
legislature is the appropriate body to deal with this issue.245 Some courts
which have granted parents the right to recover for damages proximately
caused by a doctor's negligence have allowed these damages to be offset
by any benefits conferred by the child through application of the benefit
rule. 240
On the other hand, numerous courts have granted recovery for mental
and emotional distress but denied recovery for the care, maintenance, and
medical expenses of a child.247 In refusing to allow parents to recover the
costs incident to raising a child afflicted with Down's syndrome, the court
in Berman v. Allan248 stated:
In essence, Mr. and Mrs. Berman desire to retain all the benefits inhering in
the birth of the child-i.e., the love and joy they will experience as par-
ents-while saddling defendants with the enormous expenses attendant
upon her rearing. Under the facts and circumstances here alleged, we find
that such an award would be wholly disproportionate to the culpability in-
volved, and that allowance of such a recovery would both constitute a wind-
fall to the parents and place too unreasonable a financial burden upon
physicians.2
49
In April, 1982, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Naccash v. Burger,250
considered for the first time an action for wrongful birth. As a result of
this case, Virginia now allows parents to recover expenses for emotional
distress, as well as for the care and treatment of an afflicted child.25 '1 The
suit was instituted by the parents of a child who died from Tay-Sachs
disease. The parents had sought testing to determine if they were carriers
of the genetic disease. The father was given a blood test and informed
that since the results were negative, his wife need not undergo testing. In
fact, the father's blood sample was mislabeled and confused with that of
another man. Relying upon the assurances they received, the parents con-
tinued the pregnancy. After the child was discovered to have Tay-Sachs,
further tests were conducted which showed that indeed both parents were
syndrome); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (recovery by parents for
costs reasonably related to caring for child's physical defects); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp.,
69 Wis. 2d 766, -, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975) (recovery allowed parents for past and
future medical services if certain facts proved on remand).
245. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 416, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
902 (1978).
246. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977), cited in Phillips v. United States,
508 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (D.S.C. 1981).
247. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, -, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979) (damages for emo-
tional and mental anguish); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 78-79, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933,
936-37 (1977) (damages for pain, suffering and mental anguish).
248. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
249. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 14.
250. 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
251. Id. at 414-16, 290 S.E.2d at 830-31.
342 [Vol. 17:311
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
carriers of the disease . 52 Had this been determined initially, an amnio-
centesis test 253 would have been conducted which would have revealed the
child's affliction prior to its birth.2 "
The Virginia Supreme Court held that a duty of reasonable care was
owed to the parents in the handling of the blood sample and this included
the duty to provide the parents with "reasonably accurate information"
regarding their unborn child's condition so that they could make an in-
formed decision concerning abortion.2 55 The court concluded that this
duty had been breached and also found the requisite causal connection
between the breach of duty and the injury since the parents decided to
have their child based on the negative test report which had resulted
from mislabeling.2 56 As a result of the injuries sustained by the Burgers,
the court ruled that they were entitled to damages which were reasonably
and proximately caused by the breach of duty owed them.257 Citing with
approval the case of Becker v. Schwartz,58 the court allowed Mr. and
Mrs. Burger to recover expenses incurred in the care and treatment of
their deceased infant.259 In refusing to follow Berman v. Allan260 to the
extent that it disallowed damages for the care and treatment of the child,
the court noted that the financial burden placed upon the negligent phy-
sician in Naccash was not the same as that confronting the physician in
Berman.261 In Naccash, the infant only lived a short time, and her care
and treatment were relatively inexpensive. In Berman, the child was alive
and was expected to have an extended life span.2 2 Even so, the court
noted that it did not necessarily agree that "if liability is established and
the damages claimed are compensable and just, the court should perform
a balancing test between competing economic interests in determining
whether an injured party is entitled to a particular category of
damages. '"283
In addition, the Naccash court allowed the parents to recover damages
for emotional distress, thus creating another exception to the general rule
that such damages are not allowed unless they result directly from tor-
252. Id. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827. Tay-Sachs disease is a fatal genetic disease which af-
fects the nervous system. It commonly strikes Jewish infants of Eastern European ancestry.
253. An amniocentesis test analyzes the amniotic fluid extracted from the mother's
uterus. This analysis reveals whether the fetus has gross chromosome defects. Id. at 410 n.1,
290 S.E.2d at 827 n.1.
254. Id. at 411, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
255. Id. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 829.
256. Id.
257. 223 Va. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
258. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
259. 223 Va. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
260. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
261. Naccash, 223 Va. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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tiously caused physical injury.2 The court declared that to hold other-
wise would be a "'perversion of fundamental principles of justice.' "265 It
also noted that the parents were not mere witnesses to the consequences
of the tortious conduct.268 Rather, the evidence demonstrated an unbro-
ken causal chain directly linking the erroneous report, the deprivation of
the parents' right to continue or abort the pregnancy, and the emotional
suffering endured by the parents following their child's birth.267 An exam-
ple where Naccash might be successfully argued in an IVF case is one in
which the sperm samples have been mixed up or, through some other
mishap, either in the pre-conception, conception, or fetal state, a defec-
tive child is born.
b. Wrongful Death
Another potential cause of action available to IVF parents might be a
wrongful death action, seeking recovery for the death of their child. All
states presently allow suits by the personal representative of a child born
alive for wrongful death resulting from prenatal injuries.6 8 Many states
also permit recovery for the death of a viable fetus caused by prenatal
injuries. 26 9 In such cases, the courts have generally concluded that the
term "person," as used in the wrongful death statutes, contemplates a
264. Id.
265. 223 Va. at 416, 290 S.E.2d at 831 (quoting Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 433, 404
A.2d 8, 15 (1979)).
266. Naccash, 223 Va. at 416, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
267. Id.
268. EAB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35,050.
269. See, e.g., Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Gullborg v.
Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va.
1969); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn.
Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962);
Worgan v. Gregg & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Gfa.
App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 III. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d
88 (1973); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732
(Ky. 1970); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d
633 (La. 1981); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v.
Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434
(1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H.
104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959);
Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42
(1964); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967). For cases denying recovery, see
Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191
N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266
N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); Durrett v.
Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963) (but note that wrongful death statute in Ten-
nessee amended in 1976 to include coverage of viable fetuses); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204
Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
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viable fetus capable of existence independent of its mother °.27 The courts
have also noted that it would be illogical to allow a cause of action where
an injured child survives birth for even the shortest period of time, but
deny such an action where the viable child does not survive delivery.271 In
vitro fertilization gives rise to the issue whether the concept of wrongful
death would be extended to include the wrongful destruction of an unim-
planted blastocyst. In states such as Virginia which do not even recognize
a right of recovery for injuries sustained by stillborn viable fetuses prior
to birth,27 2 the answer would clearly be no at the present time. However,
those jurisdictions which do recognize such an action for viable fetuses
might well treat the destruction of an implanted blastocyst as a wrongful
death.
27 3
c. Wrongful Destruction of Property
The only suit brought thus far involving in vitro fertilization is Delzio
v. Presbyterian Hospital,274 discussed above,275 in which the plaintiffs
successfully advanced the theory that they were entitled to recover dam-
ages for the pain they endured when their property, a culture containing
gametes belonging to them, was intentionally destroyed. It is doubtful,
however, that the courts would be willing to extend the definition of
wrongful death to incorporate the intentional or negligent destruction of
a preimplanted embryo.27
7
270. See, e.g., Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Chrisafoge-
orgis v. Brandenberg, 55 IMI. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Fowler v. Woodward,
244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428
(1971).
271. See Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Gorke v.
LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 InI. 2d
368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); O'Neill v.
Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434
(1954); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109
Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42
(1964); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971).
272. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
274. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 81-92. See also supra note 87.
276. Sweeney v. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 10-11. The Delzios also argued wrongful con-
version of personal property but damages were awarded by the jury only for mental and
physical anguish. Id.
277. It is conceivable that the intentional destruction of a preimplanted embryo could
constitute a breach of contract where the parents enter into an agreement with the doctors
and the hospital to perform in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer. Such contemplations,
however, are beyond the scope of this article.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the future, IVF will certainly become a widely used means of ther-
apy for female infertility when tubal pathological conditions exist. De-
spite the fact that such a procedure could joyfully enrich the lives of
many otherwise childless couples, some segments of our society have and
will continue to proffer objections based on moral and ethical considera-
tions. Some of these concerns are valid, and create a vital public interest
in establishing legal guidelines to prevent potential abuses. Moreover,
children born through the IVF process deserve to have their legal rights
protected in such matters as inheritance and paternity. Scientists and
physicians involved in IVF, however, also need and deserve the protection
of the law in their attempts to help infertile couples have their own chil-
dren. Yet, certainly the most emotional and arguably the most significant
concern is that of the childless couple looking to IVF as a potential solu-
tion to their frustration.
